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ABSTRACT
This paper accepts for the sake of argument the hypothesis that much of the time series correlation
between tax and profit rates is spurious, and shows how nonetheless time series for profit rates, tax
rates, and consumption can be organized, compared and interpreted using Fisher's (1930) theory of
consumption in order to understand the incidence of capital taxes. Capital taxation is associated with
a wedge between anticipated aggregate consumption growth and capital rental rates, suggesting that
in one way or another capital owner behavior adjusts in the direction needed for some "passing" of
the capital tax. Conversely, most of the medium and low frequency deviations between anticipated
aggregate consumption growth and capital rental rates are associated with capital taxation, as
implied by aggregate time-separable Fisherian consumption theories in which time preference, non-
tax capital market distortions, aggregation biases, and other determinants of aggregate consumption
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Who bears the burden of capital income taxes?  This is an important question because capital
income tax rates have increased so much over time, and vary a lot across countries.  The U.S., for
example, introduced federal corporate taxation in 1909, and rates reached as high as 52% during the
1950's (Cummins et al 1994), and now stand at 35%.  Europeans have been cutting their corporate
tax rates – for example, the 20 percentage point cuts in Germany and Ireland between 1995 and 2001
(American Council for Capital Formation 2001, citing PricewaterhouseCoopers) – to the point where
most Western European countries have lower rates than does the U.S.  Estimates of capital tax
incidence may also tell us something about the market for capital, and capital’s place in a full model
of the economy.
One approach to calculating tax incidence follows Harberger (1962), building a general
equilibrium model of the supply and demand for capital, choosing numerical values for its
parameters, and then simulating pre- and post-tax interest rates under various policy options.  My
paper uses instead measurements of pre- and post-tax interest rates, compares their evolution over
time to the time pattern of tax rates, and organizes and interprets those comparisons using Fisher’s
(1930) theory of consumption as modernized by Hall (1978).  I find that capital taxation drives a
wedge between anticipated aggregate consumption growth and capital rental rates, so that in one
way or another capital owner behavior adjusts in the direction needed for some “passing” of the
capital tax.  Conversely, most of the deviations between anticipated aggregate consumption growth
and capital rental rates are associated with capital taxation, as implied by aggregate time-separable
Fisherian consumption theories in which time preference, non-tax capital market distortions,
aggregation biases, and other determinants of aggregate consumption growth vary little over time.
A related approach – namely looking at time series correlations between a price and a tax
rate – has been used to study the incidence of excise taxes (eg., Due 1954, Evans et al 1999 and the
papers referenced therein), payroll taxes (Mitrusi and Poterba 2000), and retail sales taxes (Haig and
Shoup 1934, Poterba 1986, Besley and Rosen 1999).  This approach also appeared 40 years ago inFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 2
1Krzyzaniak and Musgrave’s famous 1963 study used data like this except they exclude
the 1940's and early 1930's, and, of course, excluded years since 1960.  They also confined their
attention to the corporate sector but, as I show below, much of the economy-wide time variation





the capital tax incidence literature, but quickly fell into disrepute for reasons that can be seen in a
simple scatter diagram like Figure 1.  Each observation in the diagram is one of the five-year
intervals 1931-35, ....  The vertical axis measures the log of the economy-wide capital rental  rate
ρ (gross of capital taxes and net of depreciation), while the horizontal axis measures the log of one
minus the economy-wide rate τ of capital taxation (both of these measures are explained in detail
below).
1  There is a clear negative correlation.  Since the after-tax rental rate is (1-τ)ρ, the magnitude
of the regression slope (1.0, or 0.5 if the years prior to 1946 are excluded) is an estimate of the
fraction of capital taxes paid by factors other than capital.  If the regression slope were closer to -1.0
than 0, one might conclude as Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) did that capital taxation increases
pre-tax profits more than it decreases after-tax profits.  However, we also see, as Goode (1966),
Slitor (1966), Cragg, Harberger, and Mieszkowski (1967) did, that capital tax rates seem to be
correlated with non-tax determinants of economic activity.  For example, tax rates were high during
the war and low during the Depression, and we doubt that tax policy alone was responsible for the
high and low capital rental rates, respectively.  Even if capital taxation increases pre-tax profits there
is still the question, raised by Goode (1966) and Gordon (1970), of whether capital taxation does so
by increasing markups, discouraging investment, or some combination.
Comparisons of investment and capital tax rate time series show zero or positive correlation
(eg., Cummins et al 1994), but are equally hard to interpret.  Does, say, a zero correlation mean that
investment is unresponsive to tax rates, or that tax rates are correlated with non-tax determinants of
investment?  Irving Fisher’s (1930) theory of consumption suggests that progress can be made by
simultaneously comparing the time series for capital rental rates, capital tax rates, and consumption
growth (ie, investment behavior).  In particular, the theoretical relation between these series can be
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2A full computation, of course, requires estimates of the elasticity of capital demand.  If it
were perfectly elastic in the long run, then even a sustained consumption growth response to
capital income taxation is consistent with no “passing on” of the tax.  Estimating capital’s
demand elasticity is beyond the scope of this paper.
where rt is the year t return on a representative piece of capital accumulated in year t-1, IMRSt is the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at dates t-1 and t, and Et-1[@] denotes expectations
as of date t-1.  τt represents a distortion between the return on capital and the utility cost of
investment.  In some theories, the year t capital income tax rate is a prime example of such a
distortion, so that rt(1-τt) is the after-tax return.  There maybe other distortions between savers and
investors, but for the moment I suppose that capital taxation is the main intertemporal distortion, or
at least uncorrelated with the other distortions.
It has been suggested by Fisher (1930), and more recently Hall (1978), that the IMRS may
be a fairly stable function of aggregate consumption at dates t and t-1.  With this extension, the Euler
equation (1) gives us a testable prediction: that anticipated capital taxation drives a wedge between
capital’s expected return and expected consumption growth.  This wedge appears in theory
regardless of whether or not capital taxation is determined by profit rates, or whether capital taxation
and profit rates are determined by non-tax factors – possibilities which were so hotly debated in the
follow up to Krzyzaniak and Musgrave’s book.  In other words, if capital taxation increases profit
rates or decreases consumption growth, or some combination of these, then we have good reason
to believe that some other factor shares the burden of capital income taxation in the long run, or the
short run, or both.
2
In summary, previous time series studies of tax incidence are hard to interpret if the tax rate
series is correlated with the state of demand for the taxed good.  This is true in principle for any tax,
such as an excise or payroll tax and, as demonstrated in Figure 1, obviously true for capital taxes.
My proposal is to consider the tax rate and pre-tax price series jointly with independently measured
behavioral series, and to apply this method to the study of capital income taxation over time.  The
results of this application are insights into the incidence of capital taxation, and empirical
evaluations of various theories of the utility cost of investment.
This empirical approach has the advantage that it does not require a numerical model of the
entire economy, or a struggle with interpreting the results of such a model when it is known to have
some important inconsistencies with observation.  It also does not depend on the degree to whichFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 4
3Data sources are detailed in the Appendix.
4Government net product is equal to the compensation of government employees,
because, as explained by Parker et al (1995, p. 36), the national accounts assume that
government assets (other than those used by government enterprises selling their output in the
marketplace) yield no services in production beyond their depreciation.
tax rate fluctuations over time may be a reaction to, or just coincident with, the state of demand for
capital.  On the other hand, the reader will notice that my calculations are hard to interpret if tax rate
fluctuations over time are possibly correlated with the state of capital supply (in Fisherian terms,
with the “rate of time preference”).
Section II presents my capital rental and tax rate data.  Section III presents the main
empirical result, followed by some sensitivity analysis.  Section IV discusses some of the theories
which are ruled out by the main empirical result, and which need further evidence in order to be
distinguished from the simple Fisherian model.  Section V concludes.
II. Measures of Pre- and Post-Tax Returns on Capital
II.A.  Capital Returns as Measured in the National Accounts
One empirical proxy for the pre-tax capital return is the pre-tax “capital rental rate”: capital
income net of depreciation per dollar of capital in place at the beginning of the year.  Capital is
measured as proportional to the BEA’s (2000) fixed assets valued at current cost, and is aggregated
for private residential and nonresidential sectors.
3  Note that the capital measured is employed
domestically (including foreign-owned capital), includes owner-occupied housing, excludes
consumer durables, and excludes the government sector.  Current cost capital is not the same as
book value, because the former aggregates real investment flows, and the latter aggregates
investment expenditure flows.  Capital income is measured accordingly, in three steps.  First, income
accruing to agents with their factors domestically and privately employed is calculated by
subtracting net government product
4 and net factor income from abroad from national income.
Second, this income is multiplied by one minus labor’s share of non-proprietors’ private national
income, in order to obtain an estimate of the income pre-direct-taxes going to domesticallyFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 5
5These two steps implicitly assume that capital and labor income accrue in the same
shares in three sectors – the nonproprietary sector, the proprietary sector, and the foreign sector. 
My formula for pre-direct-tax private sector capital income is (NI-Yg-NFI)[1-Wp/(NI-Wg-Ys)],
where Ys is proprietors’ income, NI is national income, NFI is net factor income from abroad, Wp
is the private employee compensation of domestic residents, and Wg is the labor compensation of
domestic government employees.
Figure 2  Capital Rental Rates
employed capital.
5  Third, property income tax revenue is added back into capital income, as
suggested by Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983).  Figure 2 displays this series as a solid
line; the log of this series was aggregated for five-year intervals in order to measure the vertical
distances in Figure 1.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 6
6“Expected obsolescence implicitly enters into BEA estimates of depreciation through
shorter asset lifetimes and through the retirement pattern previously used.” (Fraumeni 1997, p.
9).  The BEA does not estimate asset-and-year-specific depreciation rates (the aggregate
depreciation rate does change over time according to composition of the capital stock); several
econometric studies have failed (eg., those cited by Fraumeni 1997, p. 13) to reject the
hypothesis that asset-specific depreciation rates are constant over time.
7Appendix III provides some evidence on this point by adding to the capital rental rate ρ
the log growth of the BEA investment price index relative to the consumption price index, evn
though this addition double counts the expected economic obsolescence already included in BEA
depreciation.  The Appendix shows how the “simulated capital income tax rate” is not
significantly affected by this addition, except in the 1980's when the BEA index began a sharp
downward trend.
At least for the postwar years, Gordon (1990) and question the accuracy of the BEA
index.  Also, Cochrane (1991) and others in the finance literature have shown how capital gains
on financial assets like the NYSE portfolio are much more volatile than the returns on
investment implied by the national accounts.  Perhaps this is a weakness of the national accounts
(eg., they may exclude the “adjustment costs” emphasized in Cochrane’s study), or perhaps the
financial capital gains derive from the kinds of “preference” changes modeled by Mulligan
(2002b), and hence should be ignored in a study of the timing of aggregate consumption.  
The return on capital r can be decomposed into a rental rate ρ and a capital gain.  Capital
gains might result from a variety of forces, including aging, obsolescence, changes in the rate of
consumption taxation, and changes in the demand for the asset’s services.  To the extent that these
gains are unanticipated, and have a time-invariant covariance with consumption innovations, they
could be excluded from Euler equation estimates without affecting my results.  Perhaps one
advantage of the national accounts (for my purposes) is that their concept of depreciation includes
expected aging and obsolescence,
6 and hence may provide an estimate of a big component of the
expected capital gains.  In principle, one could test the hypothesis that, other than BEA’s estimate
of depreciation, aggregate capital gains are unforecastable, although perhaps the BEA’s estimate of
the prices of equipment, housing, and other assets are not good enough for such a test.
7  For the
purposes of this paper, I presume that aggregate capital gains, net of BEA depreciation, are
unforecastable and have a constant covariance with consumption innovations, so that capital’s pre-
tax expected return might be measured according to the amount ρ of capital income net-of-
depreciation that is earned per dollar of capital.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 7
8The estimates in this section were made possible by ongoing research with Justin G.




Tt / (tax year t corporate inc tax revenue)
% (tax year t estimated personal capital inc tax revenue)
Pt / (treasury year t property tax revenue)
(estimated personal capital inc tax revenue) /
(nonlabor inc share of AGI)(total IIT revenue)
Financial asset returns may also be related to capital returns, although it is hard to say for
sure whether, for example, the commercial paper return is tied to the pre-tax, or the post-tax capital
return.  I argue elsewhere (Mulligan 2002b) that the consumption-asset-pricing and production-
asset-pricing literature suggest that financial asset returns are much noisier measures of the return
on capital (pre- or post-tax) than capital’s rental rate.  This noise may only widen confidence
intervals on tax incidence estimates derived from financial asset returns or, to the extent that
departures between financial asset and capital returns are correlated with capital’s return or with
capital tax rates, the incidence estimates may be biased.  In this paper I therefore confine attention
to national-accounts-based measures of capital returns.
II.C.  Capital Tax Rates
There are many kinds of capital, and many forms of capital taxation.  One approach might
be to explicitly model this complexity, but we
8 follow Griliches and Jorgenson (1966, p. 58),
Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983), Lucas (1990), and Mendoza et al (1994) and attempt
to construct annual measures of the rate τt of taxation of a representative piece of capital’s date t
income.  Readers not interested in the details of this construction, and the legislative changes
creating fluctuations in the measured series may want to skip ahead to Section III.  Our construction
begins with the formula:
where Rt is date t aggregate capital income before direct taxes and after indirect taxes, and Pt isFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 8
9Lucas (1990) uses a similar method to measure the capital tax rate for 1985 (0.36). 
Mendoza et al (1994) and Lucas (1990) apparently count revenue according to the year it arrives
in the Treasury and therefore in the government budget.  For example, a personal income tax
payment made April 15, 1985 for the 1984 tax year would count as 1984 in my calculations and
as 1985 in the Mendoza et al/Lucas calculations.
10We conjecture that property tax assessors did not adjust the dollar value of their
assessment during the 1930's, when the overall price level and dollar incomes were falling,
which is why aggregate property tax revenue was pretty stable in dollar terms and such a large
fraction of aggregate capital income.
property tax revenue received by the government in year t.  These are similar to Mendoza et al’s
measures, with four exceptions (i) our definition of capital income is slightly different, (ii) we added
property taxes back into the aggregate capital income (see the denominator, and also Feldstein,
Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba 1983), and (iii) we count tax revenue according to the tax year.
9  On
point (iii), we have used IRS records to measure personal and corporate tax liabilities by tax year.
On point (iv), we assume that property tax liabilities accrue in the year prior to their arrival at the
treasury, as indicated in the formula above.  I refer to this measure as the “aggregate effective tax
rate series.”
Figure 3 displays my measure of capital income tax rates, decomposed into the corporate,
personal, and property tax components.  The middle series is the sum of personal capital income and
proporty taxes.  The top series the sum of all three, and fluctuates more over time.  Hence,  the
corporate income tax accounts for most of the combined tax rate fluctuations, with the exception of
the 1930's when corporate and personal income tax revenues were few and property tax revenues
were substantial relative to capital income.
10Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 9
Figure 3  Capital Income Tax Revenues by Major Type, 1929-97






t & ITCt&1 & zt&1
1 & ITCt&1 & zt&1
(2)
Since the postwar measured tax changes are a very important ingredient in my analysis, it
is worth understanding some of the legislative history of those tax changes.  When discussing those
changes, it is helpful to organize them using Hall and Jorgenson’s (1967) famous statutory “user
cost” formula for the distortion   between the year t marginal product of new corporate capital τ
u
t
(installed in year t-1) and the year t-1 corporate cost of funds:Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 10
where   is the statutory rate at which year t taxable corporation income is taxed, ITCt-1 is the credit τ
s
t
rate for investment in year t-1, and zt-1 is the present value of tax savings) from depreciation
allowances permitted for capital installed in year t-1.  Federal values for the formula (2)’s
ingredients are available from Cummins et al’s (1994) paper for t = 1954, ..., 1989, for equipment
and structures in manufacturing industries.  I calculated equipment and structures tax rates using the
formula (2), and averaged them weighting by the relative amounts of equipment and structures in
the manufacturing sector; this average rate   based on the statutory user cost is displayed together τ
u
t
with my aggregate effective rate in Figure 4.  The levels of these series are different because the
aggregate effective series includes property and personal income taxes, as well as state corporate
income taxes.  Interestingly, the two series have similar fluctuations.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 11
11The tax rates shown in Figure 3 are dated according to the year the capital income is
earned.
Figure 4  Two Capital Income Tax Rate Measures:
Aggregate “Effective” and Manufacturing Statutory “User Cost”
The measured effective tax rate series has five characteristics that are important for my
conclusions: the lack of a trend 1947-62, JFK’s cuts, increases during the Johnson administration,
declines 1968-82,
11 and increases since 1982.  For the period 1947-62, I have relatively little
legislative information except that the statutory corporate tax rate increased 14 percentage points
during the Korean War, and that depreciation allowances were accelerated (zt increased) in 1953.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 12
12Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) tax rate series for the nonfinancial
corporate sector suggest that capital tax rates were greater in the 1970's than in the 1960's (which
explains why they do not find (p. 154) the negative relation seen in my Figure 1 or in the 1960's
studies), mainly because they measure more property tax revenue per dollar of profits for that
sector in the 1970's, and because they have relatively high estimates for the rate of interest
income taxation in the 1970's.
13This was reinforced by personal marginal income tax rate cuts which, as explained
above, is included in my aggregate effective tax rate series but not the series derived from
Cummins et al’s manufacturing corporate study.
It is hard to tell whether these were offsetting as suggested by the effective tax rate series.  Kennedy
cut the corporate tax rate and introduced an ITC, capital income tax cuts which can be seen in both
my effective rate series and Cummins et al’s series based on the statutory user cost.  During the
Johnson administration, the corporate rate increased from 48 to 52.8%, an increase which appears
obviously in both the effective rate and statutory user cost series.
Capital income tax rates fell between 1968 and 1982, in large part because of five legislative
changes in the federal corporate income tax.
12  These rate cuts have been widely discussed in the
literature (see, for example, Auerbach 1983), and appear in both of Figure 4’s series.  Feldstein and
Summers (1978) and Auerbach (1983) explain how high inflation generated higher corporate income
tax revenues in the 1970's relative to the 1980's, and how this increase is indeed a tax on the returns
to investment.  This was important 1968-71, but according to both series in Figure 4 more than offset
by the corporate rate cut (totaling 5.8 percentage points).  Between 1971 and 1975, the ITC was
reinstated, and depreciation allowances were accelerated.  Although not necessarily a response to
new legislation, corporations increasingly took advantage of high nominal interest deductions during
the 1970's (Auerbach 1983, p. 458).  ITC’s were further increased 1975-78, and the corporate rate
was cut two percentage points after 1978.  The 1981 law changes accelerated depreciation, while
at the same time inflation was falling and making depreciation allowances more valuable.
13
Since 1982 capital income tax rates increased one or two times.  First, Cummins et al’s
examination of rates based on statutory user cost show that depreciation deductions were worth less
prior to the 1986 tax reform than they were after the 1981 reform, although I’m not sure whether this
results from a legislative change (including phase-ins of the 1981 law), or a change of the
composition of investment within the manufacturing equipment and manufacturing structures
categories studied.  Second, the 1986 tax reform eliminated the ITC and made depreciationFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 13
14Personal income taxation was changed in 1986 as well, although Barro and Sahasakul’s
(1986) series on average marginal federal personal income tax rates, as updated by Stephenson
(1998) and Mulligan and Marion (2000), only show about a 3 percentage point decline 1986-89,
and my effective tax rate series does not show any decline during those years.  Some of the
personal capital income tax reforms in 1986 may also have changed the personal-corporate
composition of capital income tax revenues than they changed the overall amount of capital
income tax revenue (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997).
allowances less generous – changes which, according to both series in Figure 4, were roughly offset
by the cut in the corporate income tax rate from 46 to 34%.
14  Third, the corporate rate was increased
to 35% beginning in 1993.
II.D. Potential Biases in Measured Tax Rates
There are a number of reasons to expect that the anticipated capital tax rate might be
measured with error (when measured as my aggregate “effective” capital tax rate), and that those
errors would affect incidence estimates.  One important issue in this regard is whether the rate of
capital taxation is anticipated at the time that investment occurs and consumption is foregone.  The
typical legislative calendar is informative in this regard, since tax laws (ie, schedules relating capital
income of various types to tax liabilities) are usually debated and passed prior to the tax year during
which they are in force, we can reasonably suppose that investors have a good idea of the one-year-
ahead relation between capital income and capital income tax liability.  If capital income taxes were
literally proportional, then this would imply that marginal tax rates are also well anticipated one year
ahead.  Marginal corporate and personal income tax rates are, in the relevant range, fairly constant
with income.
Related is the question of whether average and marginal capital income tax rates are the
same.  Again the proportionality of tax rules is relevant.  Also relevant is whether old and new
capital are treated symmetrically.  For example, we could imagine a policy that heavily taxes old
capital, thereby generating substantial revenue (measured as a ratio to the capital stock at the time
of the levy), and the appearance of a high rate of capital taxation, but did not discourage investment
in the year prior to the levy.  However, one conclusion we draw from Figure 4 is that, in terms of
time fluctuations, my effective tax rate series is similar to the tax rate on new investment measured
by Cummins et al (1994).
Another bias may derive from the composition of capital income taxes and the differentialFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 14















cyclicality of their tax bases.
15  Suppose for the sake of illustration that property taxes are zero, and
that all capital income falls either under the corporate tax or the personal tax but not both.  Then my






where the R’s are the personal and corporate components of capital income.  The formula above
shows that, if the composition of capital income were cyclical, then non-tax determinants of
economic activity may cause fluctuations in my measured tax rate even when the personal and





cyclical, then my tax rate measure would be procyclical even when personal and corporate rates are
not.  However, Figures 3 and 4 suggest that my aggregate effective tax rate series has a similar time
pattern as corporate series by themselves.
III.  Intertemporal “Distortions” Compared with Measured Capital Income Tax Rates
III.A. Calculating an Intertemporal Distortion from the National Accounts
The hypothesis of this paper is that capital income taxes drive a wedge between pre-tax
capital rental rates and simple proxies for the IMRS, exactly as described by equation (1) and,
conversely, most of the deviations between capital rental rates and simple proxies for the IMRS are
associated with capital taxation – at least at medium and low frequencies.  To demonstrate this I use
the method of Mulligan (2001, 2002a) – namely to use national accounts data to calculate a wedge
between IMRS and a capital rental rate, and then compare that wedge with measured capital income
tax rates.  The first step is to rearrange equation (1) to calculate the tax rate τt
* that makes the Euler
equation hold exactly:Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 15
16See below for a sensitivity analysis.  The rate of time preference is calibrated differently
















where, as explained above, I assume that the capital income tax rate is known one year ahead.
Following Mulligan (2001, 2002a), I refer to the tax rates {τt
*} calculated according to (1)N as
“simulated tax rates”, to be distinguished from the aggregate effective capital income tax rates {τt}
measured using IRS data as explained above.  As argued above, perhaps the best NIPA proxy for
capital’s return r is the “profit” or rental rate ρ net of depreciation shown in Figure 1 and used in the
1960's time series studies of tax incidence.
Of course, equation (1)N is of limited utility unless we have ways of measuring IMRS and
expectations.  On the first point, I follow the familiar practice of supposing that
, where β and σ sigma are constants representing the “rate of time IMRSt ' (β&1ct/ct&1)1/σ
preference” and “intertemporal elasticity of substitution” respectively.  This is a very simple model
of the aggregate IMRS, ignoring aggregation biases, time preference shifts, etc., so it would be
especially notable if this model could be used to match IMRS and after-tax capital returns.
Even with measures of IMRS, the Euler equation has no empirical content unless there are
empirical proxies for expectations.  I follow the familiar practice of supposing that the full model
of the economy (most of which is not spelled out in this paper) is Markov with a sufficiently short
state vector, so that expectations can be well proxied with fitted values from VAR’s.  The elements
in the VAR’s are: 1/IMRS, ρ/IMRS, ρ (remember that capital’s return is measured as the capital
rental rate net of BEA depreciation), the nominal commercial paper rate, the gap in promised yields
on BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and inflation.  Note that tax data is not used to calculate the
simulated tax rate, aside from the property tax adjustment of pre-direct-tax capital income as
proposed by Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983).
Figure 5 displays 5-year moving averages of measured and simulated tax rates for the years
1949-95.  An intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 2.5 is used,
16 and consumption is measuredFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 16
Figure 5  Capital Income Tax Rates: Simulated (σ = 2.5) and Measured
as real nondurable and services expenditures per person age 15+.  We see that the simulated tax rate
is fairly constant – i.e., that consumption growth roughly followed the pre-tax rental rate – prior to
the Kennedy tax cut, very much like the measured tax rate.  The Kennedy tax cut does not seem to
fit the theory, because pre-tax rental rates and consumption growth moved apart rather than moving
together.  Since then the two tax rate series are very similar – both decline about 13 percentage
points 1970-83, and both increase since 1983, although the simulated rate increases more since 1988.
It is also interesting that both series show the tax rate trough in almost exactly the same year (1982
for the simulated rate and 1983 for the measured rate).  Both series also move in a range with similar
breadth – both have a maximum about 15-20 percentage points above its minimum.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 17
17One important difference between my Figures 1 and 5 is that the latter forecasts
(functions of) r and IMRS, and the important forecasting variables are not especially the lags of r
and IMRS.  Appendix II shows the VARS, and how the important forecasting variables are the
nominal commercial paper rate, the gap in promised yields on BAA and AAA corporate bonds,
and inflation.
18Mulligan (2002b) emphasizes that the consumption growth-rental rate correlation is
very different than the consumption growth-bond return correlation because bond returns are
much more variable and are uncorrelated with capital rental rates.  Hence a large elasticity of
consumption growth with respect to capital rental rates is consistent with a small elasticity (like
that found by Hall 1988) of consumption growth with respect to bond returns.
The issue in the current paper is not what is the right intertemporal substitution elasticity,
but what is the right elasticity of consumption growth with respect to measured capital rental
rates.  If, for example, measured capital rental rates were too smooth and thereby creating
exaggerated estimates of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, these exaggerated estimates
should be used here in order to excessively smooth consumption growth by the same amount.
III.B. Sensitivity Analysis: “Intertemporal Substitution Elasticities”
My first calculation (Figure 5) depends on the intertemporal substitution elasticity σ,
although it is not particularly sensitive to that parameter.  In order to see how σ would have some
impact on the results, notice that an infinite intertemporal substitution elasticity means that IMRS
is constant over time, so that my analysis of the Euler equation (1) boils down to a comparison of
tax rates and expected capital rental rates – which might be very much like my Figure 1 and the
1960's time series studies of capital tax incidence.
17  But remember that my departure from the
1960's literature is to suppose that whatever creates spurious comovement between capital income
tax rates and capital rental rates also affects consumption growth through the capital rental rate.  So
the appropriate “intertemporal substitution elasticity” should reflect the elasticity of expected
consumption growth and expected capital rental rates, which I have argued elsewhere (Mulligan
2002b) is at least one and probably somewhat greater than two.
18  Figure 6 displays simulated tax
rates based on various values of σ.  By comparing the series derived from my preferred σ value of
2.5 (solid line) and a value of 200 (ie close to infinity, shown as a long-dashed line), we see that
adding consumption growth to the analysis makes some important differences.  For example, the σ
= 200 series shows tax rates rising immediately after the 1981 tax reform, rather than falling,
because consumption growth (essentially ignored by the σ = 200 series) was rising faster than
expected pre-tax rental rates.  The rate decline between 1966 and 1981 is seven percentage points
greater with the σ = 200 series because consumption growth was declining together with pre-taxFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 18
Figure 6  Capital Income Tax Rates: Simulated For Various Intertemporal Elasticities
rental rates.  In other words, the consumption growth series suggests that some of the comovments
between tax and pre-tax rental rates is spurious – for example, pre-tax rental rates would have
declined in the 1970's even without tax rate cuts.
Even though the value of σ has some effect on the calculations, it is easy to see why its effect
is limited.  We know from Figure 1 that pre-tax rental rates and capital income tax rates have moved
together over time.  But we also suspect from the investment literature that investment and
consumption growth are not well correlated with capital income tax rates.  The parameter σ tells us
exactly what multiple of consumption growth to subtract from capital rental rates before a
comparison with measured tax rates, but since the covariance between consumption growth and taxFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 19
19In other words, there is no government consumption; revenue from capital taxation is
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rates is weak, the covariance of the rental rate-consumption growth difference will be insensitive
to the weight placed on consumption in constructing the difference.  We see this in Figure 6 where
four values of σ are used.  σ only matters during the 1970's and early 1980's when consumption
growth and tax rates move together.  For example, both consumption growth and pre-tax rental rates
are falling in the 1970's, and the σ = 0.5 series puts the most weight on consumption growth, so it
appears that there is a growing distortion between r and IMRS.
IV. Interpretations
A Fisherian approach to consumption and savings, when combined with a simple, time-
separable model of the IMRS, and the hypothesis that capital taxation is anticipated by investors,
implies that capital income taxation causes a departure between consumption growth pre-tax capital
rental rates.  Furthermore, there appears to be exactly one percentage point departure between pre-
tax capital rental rates and the IMRS for every percentage point of capital income taxation.  That
capital taxes create intertemporal wedges of the same magnitude is familiar from public finance
theory, but this creation is by no means tautological.  The purpose of this section is to discuss some
of the theories which are ruled out by Figure 5, and which need further evidence in order to be
distinguished from the simple Fisherian model.
IV.A. NonFisherian Savings Models
Some theories of consumption are based on the hypothesis that savings rates, or consumption
growth, are insensitive to capital rental and tax rates.  To understand the first case, let all GDP be
spent on consumption and gross investment, and suppose that year t aggregate consumption is
proportional to aggregate GDP with proportion 1-s.
19  Suppose further that the capital rental rate plus
depreciation is proportional to the GDP-capital ratio, with proportion α.  The formula for
consumption growth is:Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 20
20To see this, notice that the long run pre-tax rental rate is proportional to (1-τ)
-γ and the
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where  δ is the capital depreciation rate.  In other words, capital taxation is correlated with
consumption growth only to the extent it is correlated with pre-tax rental rates.  We have already
seen how capital tax rates are much less correlated with consumption growth and national savings
rates than with pre-tax rental rates, which is consistent with the Fisher model but inconsistent with
the formula above, which, holding constant the national savings rate, requires consumption growth
to follow the pre-tax rental rate.
One way to theoretically interpret the quantitative relation between simulated and measured
tax rate is to form a hybrid of the Fisherian and constant savings rate model:
where the constant exponent γ allows for a potentially different sensitivity of consumption growth
to the tax factor as to the pre-tax rental.  γ = 1 in the pure Fisherian case, and γ = 0 in the constant
savings rate case.  If the long run demand for capital were less than perfectly elastic, and
consumption constant in the long run, then γ is also the fraction of the capital tax “passed on” in the
long run.
20  Since Figure 5 shows that simulated and measured tax rates follow each other very
closely, the Figure suggests that γ is about one and, with neoclassical capital demand, essentially all
of the capital tax is passed on in the long run.
IV.B. Theories of Taxation
Even if we accept the Fisherian model of consumption and the hypothesis that the IMRS is
well proxied by the consumption growth rate, the findings in Figure 5 are informative.  There are
several Fisherian models in which effective capital tax rates would not necessarily be associated
with a wedge between consumption growth and pre-tax rental rates.  For example there would beFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 21
21A particular case of this is McGrattan and Prescott’s (2001) model in which capital tax
revenues are reduced over time without affecting consumption growth because the capital taxes
that are cut are effectively taxing only old capital.
22Hwang and Mulligan (2003) have started in that direction.
no wedge if the capital taxation were unanticipated by investors, or applied only to old capital.
21  Or
perhaps the government manages to tax mainly those sectors where capital is inelastically supplied,
or manages to offset capital tax distortions with regulatory distortions.
IV.C. Time-Varying “Markups” or Intertemporal Specification Errors
Measured capital tax rates are strongly correlated with the gap between pre-tax rental rates
and consumption growth but, of course, this does not prove a causal link.  The correlation would be
spurious if capital tax rates happened to be correlated with other capital market distortions, or if
rental rates and/or the IMRS were mis-measured with an error that is correlated with capital taxation.
For example, time-varying efficiency in the financial intermediation process, or time-varying rates
of time preference, might cause departures between pre-tax rental rates and consumption growth
even if capital taxation were not present or were not distortionary.  If rates of capital taxation were
negatively correlated with financial intermediation efficiency, or positively correlated with the rate
of time preference, then the evidence shown in Figure 5 need not indicate that capital taxation is
distortionary.  In other words, the consumption data is a helpful addition to the 1960's empirical
incidence literature if the common determinants of capital tax rates and pre-tax rental rates are also,
solely through the after-tax rental rate, determinants of consumption growth, but are not helpful if
capital tax rates are determined by factors that have differential effects on rental rates and
consumption growth.  I leave it for future research to carefully formulate theories of this kind, and
to obtain the data necessary to separate them from the explanation offered here.
22
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) argue that corporations respond to capital taxes by marking
up their prices.  A related possibility is that the taxation of capital tends to be heavier when
corporations are charging high markups.  Either possibility is consistent with the data shown above,
and with my interpretation of it, as long as national accounts nonlabor income accurately measures
the capital rental income.  The Fisherian model is about the relation between consumption growth
and capital rental rates, regardless of whether capital rental rates are determined by markups ratherFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 22
23Under the hypothesis that aggregate GDP is a Cobb-Douglas function of labor income
and the labor market it competitive, labor income’s share of GDP fluctuates over time according
to labor demand distortions, such as the labor demand distortion resulting from time-varying
markups (see Rotemberg and Woodford 1999).
than capital productivity.  Namely, capital taxation reduces consumption growth, after-tax capital
rental rates, and capital accumulation below what they would have been with the markup held
constant and the tax eliminated.  In both cases capital owner behavior serves to “pass on” capital
taxation, although without knowledge of the causal link between taxes and markups, we cannot be
sure whether capital income taxes are passed on because they cause higher markups or because they
prevent consumption from growing in response to a high markup that would have occurred in the
absence of taxation.
However, it is possible that, because of time-varying markups, nonlabor income inaccurately
measures the capital rental rates to be enjoyed by the owners of new capital.  This might occur
because economic profits accrue mainly to old capital, or because they accrue to some factor other
than capital.  In these cases consumption growth may well follow the true capital rental rate, but the
measured capital rental rate departs from the true rental rate according to the size of the markup.
Even if capital taxation were not distortionary, any correlation between capital tax rates and markups
would be associated with a measured wedge between consumption growth and pre-tax rental rates.
Because markups can cause distortions on other margins as well, one way to test this hypothesis is
to see whether capital taxation happens to be correlated with distortions on other margins.  Hwang
and Mulligan (2003) try this, and find a correlation between labor income’s share of GDP
23 and the
rate of capital taxation for the years 1954-95, but it is weak and of the wrong (positive) sign.
V. Conclusions
Goode (1966), Slitor (1966), Cragg, Harberger, and Mieszkowski (1967) claim that capital
income tax rates are procyclical because they are determined in part by profit rates or some other
non-tax determinants of economic activity.  The evidence presented here is consistent with their
claim, because high tax rates are associated with high capital rental rates throughout the postwar
period.  However, the time series data is not as confusing as they suggest, because consumption
growth can be used as another indicator of non-tax determinants of pre-tax capital rental rates.  I findFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 23
24Perhaps the same possibility is relevant at frequencies lower than those examined here? 
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) look at U.S. taxes and GDP growth over the 20
th Century, and
Mulligan (2002c) at U.S. taxes, pre-tax rental rates, and consumption growth over the same
period.
25Remember, for example, that the VAR’s featured nominal magnitudes like inflation and
bond yields.
that high tax rates are associated with a gap between consumption growth and pre-tax capital rental
rates.  Furthermore, (fluctuations of) the gap between pre-tax capital rental rates and my proxy for
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution are of the same magnitude, which means that capital
taxation is eventually fully “passed on” via a lower capital stock, at least if the long run demand for
capital is less than perfectly elastic.  Furthermore, the procyclicality of tax rates means that such
passing on may occur even when tax rates are not correlated with investment and consumption
growth, because heavy taxation happens to occur at times when investment and consumption growth
would have been high.
24
Most of the deviations between anticipated aggregate consumption growth and capital rental
rates at low and medium frequencies are associated with capital taxation, as implied by aggregate
time-separable Fisherian consumption theories in which time preference, non-tax capital market
distortions, aggregation biases, and other determinants of aggregate consumption growth vary little
over time.  Perhaps this suggests that these other determinants of consumption growth are only
important for high frequency analysis, or that by coincidence some have been offset by others at low
and medium frequencies.
It is important to know whether the Euler equation (1) works nearly as well during the 1930's
and 1940's as it does after WWII.  After all, my calculations are alleged to deal with non-tax
determinants of pre-tax capital rental rates that are correlated with capital tax rates, and those non-
tax determinants seem abundant during this earlier period.  Second, the 1940's was a time of large,
and largely permanent, capital tax rate increases (see Figure 3) so it would be interesting to see
whether a wedge appeared between pre-tax rental rates and consumption growth and, for the
purposes of long-run tax incidence, whether that wedge persisted.  Unfortunately, the Euler equation
(1) requires calculation of expectations, and I highly doubt that the postwar VAR’s are appropriate
for calculating expectations 1930-46.
25  So I conclude the paper much like it began by calculating
5-year-interval time averages, and interpreting those time averages as expectations.  I calculate aFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 24
simulated tax rate according to equation (1)N and scatterplot it in Figure 7 versus (log of one minus)
the measured aggregate effective capital income tax rate.  The postwar data is distinguished from
the earlier period by plotting with ovals and rectangles, respectively.  Also shown in the Figure is
the 45-degree line, which would contain all of the data if the theory and measures were flawless.
In fact, the 1930's and earlier 1940's fit about as well as any time period since then!  In particular,
the theory predicts a tremendous wedge to appear between the late 1930's and the early 1940's
(notice the large horizontal distance between the two corresponding rectangles), and one does appear
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VI.  Appendix I: Data Sources
capital, current cost The current cost net stock of private fixed assets at the end of the previous
year, as reported in BEA’s Table 1.1 “Current Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer
Durable Goods”(1926-99), and Kendrick’s private domestic capital stock (1961, Table A-XV,
1900-25).  The Kendrick series is merged with the BEA series by multiplying the former by 0.771
in order to make the levels of the two series identical in 1925.  “Capital” as referenced in the text
is current cost capital, unless noted otherwise.
capital income Real income to domestically employed private capital, calculated  as
(Y-Yg)[1-Wp/(NI-Wg-Ys)], where Y is real net domestic product, Yg is the real net product of the
government sector, Ys is proprietors’ income, NI is national income, Wp is the private employee
compensation of domestic residents, and Wg is the labor compensation of domestic government
employees.  Capital income after-tax is calculated by subtracting real capital tax revenue (deflated
with the GDP deflator) in the corresponding tax year.
capital rental rate capital income/capital.  The after-tax rental rate is real capital income after-tax
per dollar of capital.  “Capital” is measured at current cost, unless noted otherwise in the text.
capital tax revenue Federal, state, and local personal capital income, corporate income, property,
excess profit, capital stock, and document & stock transfer tax revenue.  Federal personal income,
corporate income, and excess profits tax revenues are dated by tax year as reported by IRS (various
issues).  State and local revenues are dated by the year in which they arrive in the state treasuries
from U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1996, 1999).  Personal capital income tax revenue is
calculated as the product of personal income tax revenue and one minus labor’s share of AGI (1916-
99).  Before 1916, the latter is assumed to change proportionally with labor’s share of national
income.
capital tax rateCapital tax revenue/capital income.  see also the formula in the text.
consumption Nominal expenditure from Kenrick (1961, Table A-IIb, 1899-1928) and BEA
NIPA Table 1.01, line 2 (1929-99) plus$2b for alcohol (1929-32, $1.335b for 1933).  Since 1929,
BEA decomposes consumption into expenditures on nondurables, durables, and services.  Real
expenditure per person aged 15+ calculated by dividing by the GDP implicit price deflator and
Population aged 15+.  In order to increase comparability with Hall (1988), I report results in the
body of the paper derived from the nondurables-only consumption measure.  Appendix I explores
alternative specifications.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 26
domestic product Gross from Kendrick (1961, Table A-III, 1900-28) and BEA NIPA Table 1.1,
line 1 (1929-99).  Net from Gross minus  Kendrick’s (1961, Table A-III, 1900-28) National Capital
Consumption Allowances and directly from BEA NIPA Table 1.12, line 1 (1929-99).  Net product
of the government sector from Kendrick (1961, Table A-III, 1900-29) and BEA NIPA Table 1.12,
line 10 (1929-99).  Labor’s share of nonproprietor’s income from Kendrick (1961, Table 28, 1900-
28, missing years linearly interpolated).  Since 1929, employee compensation of domestic residents
from BEA NIPA Table 1.15, line 53 and compensation of government employees from BEA NIPA
Table 1.15, line 44.  Proprietor’s income from BEA NIPA Table 1.15, line 54.
GDP implicit price deflator Kendrick (1961, 1899-1928) and BEA NIPA Table  701,  line  4
(1929-99).
long-term bond yields Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield as reported by Citibase series
FYAAC (1919-99) and spliced with Census Bureau series HS X-490 by adding 50 basis points to
the latter.  Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield is an annual average of monthly yields reported on
by St. Louis Fed (1919-99).
national income, and components National income from BEA NIPA Table 1.14, line 1 (1929-)
and Census Bureau HS F-7 (-1928).  Employee compensation and proprietors' income with
inventory valuation and capital consumption allowance from BEA NIPA Table 1.14, lines 2 and 9
(1929-).  As shares of national income, employee compensation and proprietors' income are reported
by Johnson (1954, Table 1) at 5 year intervals prior to 1929; I linearly interpolate in between years.
population aged 15+ Calculated as the product of total population and the fraction of the population
that is aged 15+.  Both series are from the Census Bureau (1975, series HS A-29, 1899-1969 and
April 2000 Internet Release, 1970-99), except that the fraction aged 15+ is not always measured
directly, and in these cases interpolated between Census years.
real paper yield For year t, the nominal yield promised in year t-1 on 4-6 month prime
commercial paper, as recorded by the Census Bureau (1975, series HS X-445, 1899-1969) and U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers (1999, Table B-73), minus the GDP deflator log change from t-1 to
t.Fisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 27
Table 1 Summary Statistics, 1947-96
variable mean std dev min max
pre-tax capital rental rate 0.095 0.011 0.073 0.121
capital tax rate, aggregate effective 0.388 0.053 0.279 0.495
capital tax rate, manufacturing, based
on statutory user cost (1954-89 only)
0.273 0.067 0.141 0.371
nondur & serv. cons. gr. 0.020 0.013 -0.013 0.037
BAA-AAA bond yield premium*100 0.919 0.411 0.372 2.326
nominal paper yield 0.055 0.032 0.008 0.148
inflation 0.038 0.025 -0.001 0.102
VII.  Appendix II: VAR’s used to Calculate ExpectationsFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 28
Table 2: VARs used to Calculate Simulated Tax Rates
(t = 1947, ..., 1996)
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2 .42 .42 .81 .82
regression standard error .004 .006 .004 .004
Notes: (1) A constant term is included in all specifications.
(2) ,  where  ct is year t real nondurable and services expenditures per person IMRSt ' (β&1ct/ct&1)1/σ
age 15+
VIII.  Appendix III: The NIPA Investment Price Index and Capital Tax Incidence
The return on capital r can be decomposed into a rental rate ρ and a capital gain.  It is the
entire return r, and not just one of its components, that enters the Euler equation.  However, there
are two reasons why the entire return r is difficult to measure in the national accounts.  First, Gordon
(1990) and others have questioned the accuracy of BEA investment price series.  Second, even if
BEA investment prices measured exactly what they are supposed to measure, it is important to
recognize that investment prices are partly incorporated into BEA depreciation because the latterFisherian Capital Tax Incidence - 29
26“Expected obsolescence implicitly enters into BEA estimates of depreciation through
shorter asset lifetimes and through the retirement pattern previously used.” (Fraumeni 1997, p.
9).
is intended to measure anticipated aging and economic obsolescence.
26  Hence, if we took capital
income gross of depreciation, subtracted BEA depreciation, and then added the rate of appreciation
of investment prices, we would be counting some investment price depreciation twice.  For example,
if the aggregate capital stock became more computer-intensive (computer prices are expected to fall
more rapidly than those of most other investment goods) BEA would record more depreciation for
the aggregate capital stock and record a lower (more negative) rate of price appreciation for the
representative investment good.  The three part calculation cited above would thereby double count
the effect of computers’ economic obsolescence on the return to capital.  The “rental rate” calculated
as capital income net of BEA depreciation would correctly measure the return.
On the other hand, if there were an unanticipated investment price appreciation that was not
associated with a change in the composition of the capital stock, then the three part calculation cited
above would correctly measure capital’s return.  An alternative three-part calculation would avoid
the double-counting by replacing BEA depreciation with 0.04* the BEA capital stock, although this
would miss any changes in depreciation due to a change in the capital stock to investment goods
with shorter lifetimes.
Both the 1960's time series approach to capital tax incidence are somewhat different if either
three part calculation is used.  Each observation in Figure 8 is one of the five-year intervals 1931-35,
....  The vertical axis measures the log of the economy-wide capital return r (gross of capital taxes
and net of depreciation) measured as the sum of the three parts cited above (including BEA
depreciation), while the horizontal axis measures the log of one minus the economy-wide rate τ of
capital taxation (both of these measures are explained in detail below).  The negative relation is
steeper than in Figure 1 (which uses the rental rate on the vertical axis), especially during the
postwar period.  Figure 8’s postwar regression slope is -2.0!
When using the Euler equation approach, it is important to recognize that BEA investment
prices begin a sudden downward trend beginning about 1980.  Should a dummy variable for
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is quite similar to that shown in Figure 5 prior to 1980.  The simulated tax rate dips from 34% to
11% 1980-84, rather than the 35% to 30% dip shown in Figure 5.  By 1995 the simulated tax rate
is much closer to the measured tax rate than shown in Figure 5.  Hence, by comparison with the pre-
1980 period, the simulated tax rate matches measured tax rates better in the 1990's if BEA
investment price appreciation is included in the capital return, and better in the 1980's if excluded.
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